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Abstract
We present a model for academia with heterogeneous author types and endogenous
effort to evaluate recent changes in the publication process in Economics. We analyze
the implications of these developments on research output. Lowering the precision of
refereeing signals lowers the effort choices of intermediate ability authors, but invites
more submissions from less able authors. Increasing the number of journals stimulates
less able authors to submit their papers. The editor can improve the journal’s quality
pool of submitted manuscripts by improving the precision of refereeing, but not by
lowering acceptance standards. The submission strategy of an author is informative
of his ability.
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1 Introduction
The publication process in Economics has changed significantly in recent decades. New
journals have emerged, both general-interest and field-specific. More authors submit their
papers for publication, and acceptance rates have gone down significantly. Submitted
manuscripts have increased in length, the number of authors per paper has risen, and
more time is spent on revising before acceptance. The evaluation of the costs and benefits
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of these changes for the profession in general requires understanding of how the authors’
incentives have changed.
Theproblemof intermediated screening, where principals evaluate the output of agents,
who spend effort on improving their products, is more general than the publication envi-
ronment, but ourmodel is parsimonious enough to provide intuition for similar economic
decision-making environments. Examples include salesmanship, matrimonial decisions,
venture financing, running for elections and job interviews. All the changes in the publi-
cation process that we study, such as changes in the quantity of opportunities, collabora-
tion, competence of the decision-maker, and others, directly translate into other problems
of intermediated screening. Since we—the authors as well as many of the readers of this
paper—are familiar with the academic publication market, for illustrative purposes we
frame our model to fit this specific environment.
We propose a model of academia in which authors with heterogeneous abilities decide
whether to submit their research for publication to different journals. The decision to
submit interacts with the editor’s rule of acceptance based on the quality of articles as
perceived by referees. Authors put effort into improving the quality of their manuscripts,
which benefits acceptance chances.
Using our baseline model, we can represent most of the changes on the publication
marketmentioned above by varying the observable institutional parameters, ranging from
the relative importance of noise in the refereeingprocess and increased competition among
journals to changes in quality standards. We show that our heterogeneous author types
are affected differently by changes in institutional settings, affecting individual effort and
overall research quality. We find that if referees supply noisier reports, it encourages less
able authors to submit their papers to journals for consideration, making competition
harsher. Increased quality competition among journals increases the effort and quality
of the papers submitted by more able authors, and reduces the quality of manuscripts
and effort exerted by less able authors. The introduction of outside options, such as open-
access journals, reduces the quality of research output. When a general interest journal
competes with a specialized field journal, only the intermediate ability authors find it op-
timal to submit their manuscripts to field journals first. Coauthorship may improve the
average quality of manuscripts, but only intermediate ability authors collaborate.
Following the literature review, we outline our baseline model, where authors choose
between submitting their paper to a selective journal, or sending it off to an unread journal
for certain publication. Thenwe extend our model to account for the possibility of writing
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multiple papers, coauthorship and sequential submission to multiple selective journals.
Finally, we outline the informational content of the publication decisions, and conclude.
1.1 Literature Review
Since publications are among the most important factors regarding decisions on scientific
development and career-related questions, there exists a thriving literature on the aca-
demic review process. We summarize the main results from this literature below.
Hamermesh (2013) analyzes publication data from the past sixty years. He finds sig-
nificant changes in the methodology of published papers and a substantial increase in the
number of authors per paper. Card and DellaVigna (2013) present a collection of stylized
facts regarding trends in the academic publicationmarket. The authors report that annual
submissions to top journals in Economics have doubled since the 1970s but the total num-
ber of articles published in the same journals has declined, thereby reducing acceptance
rates from around 15% to 6%. The length of research articles has tripled and the number
of authors per paper has increased significantly. The authors assert that their insights are
consistent with an increase in quality competition among economists in recent decades.
Ellison (2002b) investigates trends in the academic review process and finds a substan-
tial slowdown in turnaround times in the past 30 to 40 years (from 6 months to about 24
months) in top economic journals. He concludes that most of the slowdown is generated
by shifts in social norms and increased competition in quality. Ellison (2011) stresses the
impact of “outside” options such as the internet or open access journals on the referee-
ing and publication process, suggesting that the role of journals in disseminating research
has been reduced. His results indicate that the existence of outside options lowers the
attractiveness of high end authors to go through the peer review process.
The following empirical results are generally agreed.
Editors are active Laband (1990) analyzes the editorial decision making process in five
top Economics journals. While editors are found to be concerned with maintaining and
improving the quality of papers published in their journals, he also finds that the screen-
ing process is by and large inefficient. Laband and Piette (1994) investigate the impact
of editorial favoritism on the publication process. They find that favoritism may increase
efficiency, but it also increases the variance in quality of published articles.1
1Medoff (2003) argues that connected authors choose to publish their better papers at journals where
their friends are editors.
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Referees screen In Laband (1990), more frequently cited papers tend to have longer ref-
eree reports. Hamermesh (1994) presents various stylized facts about the refereeing pro-
cess in Economics such as the matching of well known authors to better referees (positive
sorting) and the general slowdown in the submission-acceptance times in top Economics
journals. He also finds that monetary incentives may speed up the review process. Azar
(2005) focuses on the first response times of journals and suggests that the observed slow-
down in first-round turnaround times could be socially beneficial, since the effort costs of
referees could have increased over time. Welch (2014) estimates the noise part in referee
signals to be about twice as large as the common part.
Author identity matters Blank (1991) compares single- versus double-blind peer re-
view systems via a randomized experiment using manuscripts submitted to the American
Economic Review. Acceptance rates are lower for almost all researchers except researchers
from the top 5 departments (who arguably are harder to anonymize), and reviewers are
less constructive under a presumably more noisy double-blind peer review system. The
decline in acceptance rate is strongest for authors from mid-ranked Economics depart-
ments. Bornmann (2011) provides a large scope overview over the academic refereeing
process in different fields, finding mixed evidence of a gender bias. Baghestanian and
Popov (2014) find evidence of significance of the authors’ employment place and PhD
program rankings on the publication success even for the top 100 authors in 6 areas of
Economics.
Many relevant theoretical contributions are related to incentives in refereeing. Engers
and Gans (1998) show that, when referees care about the journal’s quality, monetary in-
centives may speed up refereeing, but may slow down the process of finding referees; this
reduces efficiency and lowers journal quality. Chang and Lai (2001) show that it may be
optimal for editors to incentivize referees in equilibrium if the referees gain reputation
from the refereeing activity itself. Their results imply that higher quality journals find it
less difficult to recruit referees, thus maintaining their quality advantage.
Author incentiveswere studied, too. Leslie (2005) shows that submission fees and slow
turnaround times in high quality journals can increase journal quality by discouraging
“long-shot submissions”, and Cotton (2013) introduces author heterogeneity with respect
to sensitivity to these tools in order to warrant the equilibrium usage of both. Atal (2010)
derives conditions under which competition among journals lowers quality cutoffs for
publications. Similarly, Barbos (2014) shows that two-sided informational incompleteness
from the perspective of editors and that of authors may lead to a quantitative decrease in
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submitted papers.2 Ellison (2002a) establishes the best policy of weighting the quality of
the paper and efforts to satisfy editors rather than on a change in fundamentals on incen-
tives for authors; moreover, our authors are heterogeneous. Taylor and Yildirim (2011)
study the choice between blind and non-blind review, arguing that even though neither is
dominant, the first provides ex-ante better incentives to authors, whereas the latter gives
better ex-post paper selection. Oster (1980) and Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009) study the
optimal submission sequence: the former is concernedwith trading off faster publications
against greater prestige, whereas the latter extend the results to risk aversion.
2 One Good Journal Model
In our baseline model, the academia consists of authors who submit their papers to a single
journal for publication.
There is a continuum of authors of measure 1. Authors are heterogeneous with respect
to their abilities θ: a paper produced by an author of type θ has innate quality θ. θ is
distributed with a cumulative density function (cdf hereafter) G(·) and a continuous and
strictly positive probability density function (pdf hereafter) g(·) with support (−∞,+∞).
Authors can spend effort e to boost their paper quality up to q = θ + e, paying costs c(e).
The effort cost function is twice continuously differentiable, strictly convex and negligible
at zero3: c′′(e) > 0, c(0) = 0 and c′(0) = 0.
The editor would like to fill the journal with the best available papers, but she can only
observe the quality of submitted papers with noise. That is, upon sending the paper of
quality q to referees for evaluation, the editor receives a signal of q̃ = q + αε, where α
is a positive parameter representing the comparative importance of noise in the referees’
evaluations, and ε is the paper-specific noise, distributed with cdf F (·), and twice differ-
entiable pdf f(·), positive on full support4 (−∞,+∞). The editor then uses a cutoff rule:
a paper is accepted for publication only if q̃ is larger than the exogenous threshold q̂. The
editor’s mission is to maintain a standard; we discuss later what motivates this cutoff.
2Barbos (2014) investigates “project” submissions from amore general perspective, but the adaptation of
the problem into the academic publishing process is straightforward. All intuition from our results in the
publication framework is retained in this more general “project” submission framework.
3In proofs, we never use the assumption that c(0) = 0. For a single journal framework, one can incorpo-
rate submission costs by assuming that c(0) = c̄ > 0. In the case of many journals, submission costs can be
incorporated in the spirit of Heintzelman and Nocetti (2009).
4Results can be extended with technical caveats if errors have a bounded support.
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The author’s problem is twofold. Authors can attempt to submit their paper to the
journal that has an audience (just journal hereafter). If the paper is accepted, the author
scores 1 publication; we normalize the utility of this outcome to 1. If the paper is rejected,
the author can send it to an all-accepting journal that has no readers (bad journal hereafter),
and collect δū < 1 of reservation utility, where δ ∈ [0, 1) represents the time discounting
costs, and ū ∈ [0, 1) is the payoff from having one more line in a CV. Alternatively, the
author can send his paper to the bad journal immediately, and harvest ū of utility. Thus,
the author who attempts submission will choose effort based on maximizing
P (accept)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (θ + e+ αε > q̂) +
P (reject)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (θ + e+ αε ≤ q̂) δū− c(e) = 1−
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1− δū]F
(
q̂ − θ − e
α
)
− c(e).
We are interested in studying the optimal policies of the authors: a collection of the
author’s self-selection cutoff level θ̂; and the author’s effort choice level e∗(θ) such that
• e∗(θ) solves the Effort Choice Problem of the author whose ability is θ ≥ θ̂:
e∗(θ) ∈ argmax
e
{
1− [1− δū]F
(
q̂ − θ − e
α
)
− c(e)
}
.
• the author’s self-selection cutoff level θ̂ is such that only authors of θ > θ̂ find it
optimal to submit their papers:
1− [1− δū]F
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
− c(e∗(θ)) ≥ ū iff θ ≥ θ̂.
Below, we study the effects of the changes in an author’s incentives driven by the fun-
damentals. We show that different authors have different responses to the same changes
in fundamentals, both in magnitude and in the direction of change. The shape of the dis-
tribution of submitted papers’ qualities, therefore, changes ambiguously on our level of
generality of assumptions. While we could have restricted our assumptions for the ease of
characterizing equilibrium effects (for instance, limiting ourselves to binary effort choices),
we would lose the economically significant variety in an author’s responses. We therefore
focus on his incentives and responses to changes in other participants’ actions in isolation
from other participants’ feedback. We reflect on the editor’s feedback along the narrative
path, along with a discussion of other potential stakeholders’ reactions.
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ε
MB(e)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− δū
α
f(·)
q̂ − θ q̂
MC(e)︷︸︸︷
c′(·)
q̂ − θ − e
(a) Marginal Benefit of Effort
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(b) High θ, one intersection
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(c) Small θ, one intersection
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
A
B
C
(d) Two Intersections
Note: On Figures 1b–1d, the intersection of solid marginal benefit (MB) lines and dashed marginal cost (MC) lines represent the amount of effort chosen by authors of various
levels of θ. Dotted lines represent the change of the marginal benefit due to an increase in θ. See Proof of Lemma 1 for the discussion of how Figure 1d conveys intuition that the
jump in endogenous effort can only be upwards, from intersectionA to intersectionC.
Figure 1: Optimal Effort Choice
2.1 Effort Choice Problem
Consider an authorwith ability level θwho chooses effort level e. The first-order condition
of this problem is [
1− δū
α
]
f
(
q̂ − θ − e
α
)
= c′(e). (1)
The left-hand side of the equation represents the marginal benefit (MB) of the spent ef-
fort; the right-hand side represents the marginal cost (MC) of effort. Figure 1a illustrates
this choice: each author, if not spending any effort, would submit a paper that would
be rejected if ε < q̂ − θ. If this author spends ẽ of effort, all referees’ noise outcomes in
[q̂−θ− ẽ, q̂−θ] regionwill no longer get the paper rejected. Becausemarginal benefit is not
monotone, the maximum effort is exercised by authors of intermediate ability. For high
θ, Figure 1b shows that an increase in ability θ will lead to a lower level of chosen effort,
whereas for small θ, as on Figure 1c, an increase in ability θ will increase effort.
The necessary local second-order condition is
−1− δū
α2
f ′
(
q̂ − θ − e
α
)
− c′′(e) < 0. (2)
This shows that the problem that we study is not necessarily convex. Figure 1d shows that
there may be multiple maxima. However, the optimal effort is finite: even very great e
cannot provide more than 1 unit of total utility, and for big enough e, c(e) > 1 by strict
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concavity. Moreover, since f(·) > 0 and c′(0) = 0, zero effort is always suboptimal. There-
fore, the effort choice is finite and upper hemicontinuous.
Assumption 1. f(·) is single-peaked, with peak at 0, and ε has a finite mean.
f(·) is single-peaked whenever f(·) is log-concave, which is a common assumption for
“noise”. This is not a necessary assumption for the following results, but it is a useful
property that allows a concise characterization of many findings.
Let us denote with θ0 the value of θ such that the quality of the paper written by an
author with θ = θ0 crosses q̂:
θ0 :

lim
θ→θ0−
θ + e∗(θ) ≤ q̂,
lim
θ→θ0+
θ + e∗(θ) ≥ q̂.
(3)
Without jumps in e∗(θ) at θ = θ0, this endogenously defined author type publishes his
paper if and only if ε > 0. For symmetric f(·), such an author’s chance to publish is 1/2.
Lemma 1. e∗(θ) is single-peaked.5 If there are two solutions to the effort choice problem at θ̌,
limθ→θ̌− e
∗(θ) < limθ→θ̌+ e
∗(θ), so the “jumps” in e∗(θ), if any, are only upward. The maximum
effort is exercised by an author with ability θ0.
Because of Lemma 1, many of the results discussed below hold even if e∗(θ) is not
continuous, as in Figure 1d, including the following one.6
Lemma 2. The quality of a submitted paper, θ + e∗(θ), is increasing in type θ.
2.2 Author’s Best Response and Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we analyze the effects of changes in variables that are exogenous to an
author’s problem. The following result analyzes the effect of increased quality standards.
Proposition 1. An increase in q̂ increases the effort level of more able submitters (θ > θ0) and
decreases the effort level of less able submitters (θ < θ0). The chance to publish and the utility of all
authors go down.
5Taylor and Yildirim (2011), Barbos (2014), and Grant (2014) obtain similar single-peakedness results.
6Hereafter, we omit caveats about situations when e∗(θ) suffers a jump in a specific point of interest: they
are not generic, and they are handled similarly to the handling of issues with θ0 in Lemma 1.
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The intuition behind the previous result is straightforward. When it gets harder to
publish, thosewho have good chances of publication (θ > θ0) find it optimal to spendmore
effort to overcome some of the higher hurdles, whereas those who have lower chances of
publication (θ < θ0) simply give up.
Empirically, it is hard to observe effort of those who seek publication. To empirically
test our findings, one could use a proxy, such as the time between revisions, and study
whether a change in the threshold (such as a change in the editorial board) changes the
amount of time authors spend on revisions, and whether authors of higher ability, mea-
sured by recent citations or affiliation, behave differently from authors of lower ability.
Quite a few authors, starting with Ellison (2002b), find that, on average, total time to re-
vise comoves with lowering acceptance rates; finer data on individual revisions, along
with proper handling of the nonlinearity of the effect, are necessary to test this propo-
sition properly. Ignoring the nonlinearity might still provide an estimate of the average
effect, but unaccounted nonlinearity would make it look less statistically significant than
it is.
Proposition 2. For almost every θ, an increase in ū or δ reduces the effort level, lowers the chance
to publish, but increases the utility of those who submit. More authors submit their papers if δ
increases, and fewer authors submit papers if ū increases.
If the bad journal starts being more attractive, it cannot reduce the utility of authors. A
higher payoff associated with a publication in the bad journal limits the losses if the paper
is not accepted, making the expenditure of effort less attractive. A simultaneous increase
of ū and a decrease in δ cannot affect efforts, but lowers submissions. If we had modeled a
submission fee explicitly, it would not have increased the benefits of publication directly,
and hence would not have affected effort, but it would have lowered the participation of
authors.
Even without heterogeneity with respect to comparative acuteness of monetary versus
time costs (à la Cotton, 2013), the difference in the effects of time and monetary costs on
endogenous effort and participation rates can create variability in the application of the
two across disciplines, simply due to the difference in the relative importance of effort and
submission pool size in different disciplines.
Empirically, large increases in ū and δ, such as the award of tenure, should manifest
themselves in lower effort, which would be hard to distinguish from the age effect (see
Oster and Hamermesh (1998)); if, however, tenure leads to no output, particularly among
those who were struggling to publish before, age is unlikely to be the cause.
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ε
MB(e)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− δū
α
f(·)
q̂ − θ q̂
MC(e)︷︸︸︷
c′(·)
High θ Intermediate θ Low θ
q̂ − θ − e
(a) Marginal Benefit of Effort
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(b) High θ
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(c) Intermediate θ
e
MB(e)
MC(e)
(d) Low θ
Note: On Figures 2b–2d, the intersection of the solid Marginal Benefit (MB) line and the marginal cost (MC) line represents the effort choice for for the different values of θ.
Dotted lines represent the change of the marginal benefit (MB) due to an increase in α. Dashed MC lines help determine the subregions of θ where the direction of change in
effort is defined based on Proposition 3.
Figure 2: Change in Effort Because of the Change in Refereeing Quality
2.3 Refereeing Quality
Proposition 3. For almost every θ, an increase in α:
• lowers the effort level for authors in the neighborhood of θ0, endogenously defined by (3);
• increases the effort level for some author types above and some author types below θ0 (in
particular, high enough author types and low enough author types increase efforts);
• if f(·) is strictly log-concave, there exist θ̌1 and θ̂1 where θ̌1 < θ0 < θ̂1, such that effort
decreases on (θ̌1, θ̂1), and increases on (−∞, θ̌1) ∪ (θ̂1,+∞);
• lowers the expected utility from submitting papers for able authors (θ > θ0), and increases it
for less able authors (θ < θ0).
If θ̂ > θ0, the quantity of submissions goes down; it goes up if θ̂ < θ0.
Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism. Figure 2a mirrors Figure 1a, showing how the
increase in α affects the marginal benefit component of authors’ effort choice problems.
When the noisiness of referees’ evaluations increases, authors with very high θ face a
higher chance of Type II error, and they increase their effort because the marginal cost
of their effort is small, since they apply little effort; Figure 2b illustrates. But authors with
very low abilities face a higher chance of acceptance due to an increase in Type I errors:
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refereesmight provide very favorable reports to inferior papers, and the editormight pub-
lish such papers even if they were not very well written. These authors, simultaneously,
do not exert much effort; thus, the marginal cost of effort for them is small. See Figure 2d
for illustration. Only authors of papers with quality approximately equal to the editor’s
imposed threshold reduce their efforts (see Figure 2c). The marginal product of effort for
these authors is smaller, because the same amount of extra effort compensates less noise,
which leads to lower choices of effort.
A poorer quality of refereeing does not have to be detrimental for the total amount of
effort exerted by authors; some authors may even find it optimal to increase effort.7 In
any case, increasing αmakes submission a better opportunity for less able authors, and a
worse opportunity for authors whose work is above the editor’s threshold.
These insights provide a new possible explanation why referees, many of whom are
prominent faculty with significant opportunity costs of foregone consulting, work on ref-
eree reports even though their pecuniary payoff from refereeing is meager. Poorer quality
in referee reports hurts able authors in equilibrium, and referees in Economics journals
are sophisticated enough to acknowledge this indirect effect. Demotivating less able au-
thors from attempting submission will lower the amount of refereeing, which is another
possible explanation.
One could test our predictions empirically if one could access the publication data for
different outlets, as does Welch (2014), and measure the change of α over time. These
data however are not readily available: most participants of the publication process prefer
their communication to be discreet. One could, however, could estimate the distribution
of quality of published papers over time, using citations from, e.g., 5 years after publica-
tion as a proxy for the paper’s quality, and then compare the dynamics of density of this
distribution in time, which, assuming little change in the remaining fundamentals, can
hint at the change in α. A change in the lower tail of the distribution will be hardest to
observe: the limit of at most zero citations is binding.
2.4 The Strategic Editor
Editors are strategic actors. Editors face constraints, such as journal capacity, limited refer-
eeing resources, readership response to journal composition, and their own research time.
7Indeed, it can in principle be the case that all authors who attempt submission improve their efforts as
a result of a decrease in α. However, if f(·) is symmetric, such outcome would require that authors who’d
have a 50% acceptance chance choose not to submit their papers, which is not the case in Economics.
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Our findings can be used to obtain predictions about editors’ constraints. For instance,
more submissions imply harder pressure on the capacity constraint if θ̂ < θ0. Proposition
2 suggests that a decrease in δ will lead to more submissions; Proposition 1 suggests that
lowering standards would not work to decrease submissions, so an editor who wanted to
keep the same journal capacity would, as a response to either higher α or lower δ, raise the
admission standard. However, beyond journal capacity concerns, the editor’s response is
somewhat harder to analyze.
One specifically interesting problem that an editor faces is to find appropriate review-
ers. Improving the match of the referee’s interests to the paper, the editor can effectively
improve the quality of a referee’s signal, α. Here we show that editors may have a strategic
interest in perpetuating noise in the review process.
q
ε
q̂/α
q̂
Note: The thick diagonal line shows the original acceptance threshold. Papers to the right of the thick line are accepted. The dashed line shows the acceptance threshold after a
decrease in α. Areas shaded with are the papers that are accepted both before and after a decrease in α. Areas filled with depict the papers that get accepted after the
decrease in α, but were not before; areas filled with are the papers which were accepted before, but not after.
Figure 3: Editor’s Selection Process
If an editor who wonders whether to spend more effort on picking better referees to
lowerα ignores the effect that he has on the effort choice of the authors e∗(·), the outcome is
straightforward to characterize. The decrease in α always improves the resulting selection
of θ. Figure 3 illustrates: an author with a paper of quality of q = θ+e∗(θ) needs to obtain a
sufficiently high signal from the referee to be above the thick diagonal line, and the lower
is α, the steeper is the slope. Authors with a paper of quality q̂ are unaffected, and authors
with a paper of quality q = 0 need a much more favorable referee to pass the threshold.
Clearly, filtering based upon signals with lower α produces a better distribution of θ+e∗(θ)
in the likelihood ratio sense, and, by the monotonicity of θ+ e∗(θ), a better distribution of
θ as well. Therefore, if an editor cares only about selecting the most able authors, she will
try to minimize noise in the refereeing process.
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The editor, however, may also care about the effort exerted by authors, and hence about
the quality of submitted papers. Indeed, higher total effort leads to an increase in quality,
whichmay lead tomore journal subscriptions. If the editor decreases α, then themost able
authors, whom the editor is more likely to publish after lowering α, are also the authors
who exert less effort. One can see that the capacity of the journal might matter in this
context: in the case of Figure 4a, themass of additional papers accepted by the journal (the
area shaded with ) can be larger than the mass of additional papers which are rejected
(shaded with ). The opposite holds for selective journals: see Figure 4b for comparison.
If the editor is strategic in the Stackelberg sense, she will also take into account the re-
sponse of authors to changes in the referees’ precision. In Figure 3, the editor anticipates
that an increase in αwill be accompanied by a change in the quality distribution of submit-
ted papers. If the editor attempts to improve the signal’s quality, he will face some reduc-
tion of effort among those authors who are significantly above the acceptance threshold,
and some increase among thosewho are in the close vicinity of the threshold. Moreover, if
the editor cares about the whole profession, not only about the journal, one can construct
examples in which an increase in α results into an increase or a decrease in the total effort
exerted by authors. The three ability areas in the support of θ, which respond differently
to changes in α (see Proposition 3), translate into three areas in the equilibrium quality
distribution, which are affected by changes in α. To illustrate the change, consider Figure
5a. The figure illustrates the relative changes, in comparison to the scenario in Figure 4a,
if the editor anticipates that the effort choices of authors will be affected by a decrease in
α. As illustrated in the figure, the shape of the paper quality distribution changes. Both
Figures 5a and 5b show the same patterns. The new distribution of quality of submit-
ted is shifted to the left, with a perturbation around the admission threshold, which is
q
q̂
Papers
(a) Less selective journal (low q̂)
q
q̂
Papers
(b) More selective journal (high q̂)
Note: The figures show the effects of a decrease inα on the equilibrium quality distributions of accepted and rejected papers. The area which includes the black solid line and the
shaded region is the overall quality distribution of papers. Areas shaded with are the papers that are accepted both before and after a decrease in α. Areas filled with depict
the papers that get accepted after the decrease in α, but were not before; areas filled with are the papers which were accepted before, but not after.
Figure 4: First-Order Changes in the Composition of Accepted Papers: Decrease in α
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q
q̂
Papers
(a) Less selective journal (low q̂)
q
q̂
Papers
(b) More selective journal (high q̂)
Note: Areas shaded with are the papers that are accepted both before and after a decrease in α. Areas filled with depict the papers that get accepted after the decrease in α,
but were not before; areas filled with are the papers which were accepted before, but not after. Dotted densities denote the shape of the paper quality distribution before the
change in α.
Figure 5: Strategic Editor Takes The Change in Effort into Account When Lowering α
governed by Proposition 3. Thus, a strategic editor may actually prefer a quite noisy ref-
ereeing process: the right tail of the paper quality distribution improves in the first-order
stochastic dominance sense with refereeing noise. Editors with concave preferences over
the published paper types might find that the paper quality distribution improves in the
second-order stochastically dominating sense if the threshold for attempting to publish θ̂
is significantly above the lower critical author type that chooses the same level of effort in
both more- and less-noise environments.
3 Applications
In the following applications we will normalize α to 1 except when we need it explicitly.
3.1 Two Good Journals, One Paper
Assume that, instead of one good journal, there are two good journals, indexed by 1 and
2. What are the implications of more competition between journals on authors?
Same journals Assume that a publication in either journal yields 1 unit of utility to the
author. Assume the editors apply the same standard q̂ as they would use if they were in
the framework with one journal, providing similar chances for publishing a the paper of
quality q. Therefore, the only difference to the benchmark scenario is the possibility of
resubmission.8 Would the outcome discussed in Section 2 remain?
Authors submit papers to one of the journals for review; we will discuss simultane-
ous submissions later. If the editor of the chosen journal chooses to reject a paper, the
8This makes authors indifferent between two journals. However, the publication outcomes might be
different: if all authors submitted first to Journal 1, Journal 2 would get only the rejects of Journal 1 in its
submissions, and the average quality of published papers in two journals might be different.
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paper is resubmitted9 to another journal. We assume that editors do not treat first- and
second submissions differently (for instance, always rejecting all papers which were not
submitted to their journals as a first choice): after all, the editors know that the authors
are indifferent between the two journals.10 Rejection, however, is an informative signal,
and editors would like to know about it, but since it is an unfavorable signal, authors do
not, in practice, advertise prior rejections in cover letters. The editor in our two-period
model can learn that the paper was once rejected by looking at the calendar, but editors
in practice do not have a perfect signal about the quantity of prior rejections, and can only
infer it from the relative rank of their journal: similarly ranked journals are likely to face
similar prior journal submission pathways over time.
Authors who submit to Journal 1, and then to Journal 2, choose the effort to maximize
1− F (q̂ − θ − e) + F (q̂ − θ − e)δ (1− F (q̂ − θ − e) + F (q̂ − θ − e)δū)− c(e).
The author then compares the expected value to the outside option ū, and submits the
paper if the former is larger. The author’s submission strategy decision changes insignifi-
cantly: each author will either submit to one journal, and after rejection to another, or not
submit at all.
The author’s effort choice problem changes, too. We will retain e∗(·) to denote the
optimal effort choice. The new first-order condition is
[1− δ + 2δF (q̂ − θ − e)(1− δū)] f (q̂ − θ − e) = c′(e). (1’)
Lemma 2 remains valid: the quality of a paper increases with the author’s ability. This
monotonicity result is helpful in characterizing the change in effort.
Proposition 4. There is an ability level θ1 such that, when comparing one-journal academia to
two-journal academia, among the latter, effort is higher for authors with ability θ < θ1 and lower
for authors of ability θ > θ1.
9We omit the possibility of interim revision, since, by assumption, authors know the type of their papers,
and can learn nothing from referee reports. Authors have no uncertainty about acceptance thresholds either.
Inability to invest or disinvest efforts in between can be relaxed to obtain additional effects on effort allocation
over time.
10If the noise about the paper quality ε was correlated across journals, the rejection in another journal
would be informative for the author. We, however, want to minimize the change between the behavior
of one editor and two editors, to concentrate on the effects that arise simply from two submission options
instead of one. Having a lower standard for those who submit as a first choice, compensated by a higher
standard for the re-submitters, can encourage some authors, and prevent some resubmissions, lowering the
referee load, but can also admit papers of worse quality.
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Even if the author gets an unfortunate review in the first round, his paper fails only if
both reviews are unfortunate. Only authors with a small probability of publication might
get motivated to exercise more effort. Since every author who found it optimal to submit
his paper originally will still find it optimal to submit his paper when he has a chance to
resubmit to another good journal, there will be more total submissions.
To test this proposition empirically, one could attempt to obtain data on time authors
spend revising their papers, whether from editors of journals or from surveying authors
themselves. At times when new journals appear (such as the American Economic Journal
series from the AEA), one should expect a change in the efforts of authors who work in
the relevant fields. The proposition above suggests that the effect will be different for
authors of different ability, not only inmagnitude but also in a sign; one could use properly
normalized citations of solo papers by authors as a proxy for the author’s ability.
The symmetric threshold outcome is unlikely to be stable generically: if the editor of
Journal 2 by chance imposes a somewhat weaker admission threshold, authors would
prefer to submit to Journal 2 first. The most important consequence of this outcome is that
Journal 2 would have a better distribution of papers under consideration: after all, Journal
1 will get only those papers that were rejected by the referees of Journal 2. This will affect
the readership, the refereeing load in both journals, and the reward from publication.
Therefore, when there are two journals, they are likely to be different.
Different Journals Assume that a publication in Journal 1 yields 1 unit of utility to
an author, and a publication in Journal 2 yields γ < 1 utility. The expected payoff of an
author who submits to Journal 1 first, and to Journal 2 afterwards, is then
1− F (q̂1 − θ − e) + F (q̂1 − θ − e)δ (γ (1− F (q̂2 − θ − e)) + F (q̂2 − θ − e)δū)− c(e).
If editors apply the same standard q̂ = q̂1 = q̂2, providing the same chances for publi-
cation for an author whose paper quality is q, authors who find it optimal to submit their
papers to Journal 2, find it worth submitting to Journal 1 too. The reverse is not true.
Proposition 5. If γ > ū, the authors’ ability space splits into three intervals: all authors from the
lower ability interval abstain from submission; all authors from the highest ability interval submit
their papers to Journal 1, followed by resubmission to Journal 2; and authors of intermediate ability
interval submit to Journal 1 without attempting to resubmit to Journal 2 if they fail to publish in
Journal 1. The intermediate interval is not empty if γ is not too high.
16
While fairly few authors share the history of their attempts to publish their papers, a
survey, or a CV-collecting web crawler, can reveal at least a part of it; proxying the ability
with solo citations, affiliation, or collected awards would allow to study the differences.
No paper, as far as we know, has tried to analyze resubmission patterns; editors and pub-
lishers themselves would be interested in an analysis of this kind.
Since we assume that ε is uncorrelated across journals, a new small but demanding
journal with low payoff of acceptance can, in fact, obtain a better average quality of pub-
lished papers than the equally demanding more prominent “old" journal. While it is true
that the new journal’s submissions will consist only of the rejections of the old journal,
the support of submitters to the new journal will be narrower: authors of relatively low
ability will abstain from resubmitting of their rejected papers. Lowering the admission
standards will not help to attract able authors.
Proposition 6. Let f(·) be log-concave. Consider a choice between
• Strategy 1: submitting first to Journal 1 (with payoff from publication of 1 and editor’s thresh-
old q̂1), and resubmitting in case of rejection to Journal 2 (with payoff γ < 1 and editor’s
threshold q̂2 < q̂1), and
• Strategy 2: submitting first to Journal 2, and resubmitting to Journal 1 in case of rejection.
When Journal 2 has marginally lower admission standards and marginally lower payoff from pub-
lication, there is a unique type θ̄ such that all types θ < θ̄ choose Strategy 2, and types θ > θ̄ choose
Strategy 1. This separation result is generically non-local.
Other options, such as submitting to one journal only before sending the paper off to a
bad journal, are also possible, but are not relevant when differences in payoffs are small.
Field Journals To illustrate the decision making in submissions and resubmissions
to a field journal, we modify the different journals framework to represent the journals’
specialization. The referees in a journal are frequently authors in the same journal. At
best, the editor in a general interest journal can provide an author with the same match of
referees as in a specialized journal, but this is not in the interest of an editor of the general
interest journal: this editor wants the paper to be understandable and interesting for a
general audience. Therefore, the referees’ noisiness in the field journal α2 = α is less than
in the first journal: α1 = 1 > α.11
11One can argue that top general-interest journals could use better referees than field journals do, because
of the inherent multi-period game between the editor and the referees, so it is fair to assume that α > 1. In
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Note: u1(θ) is the expected payoff of submitting to a general interest journal. u2(θ) is the expected payoff of submitting to a field journal with a maximum payoff of γ, but with
a refereeing precision of α < 1. u3(θ) is the utility of submitting first to a field journal with the refereeing precision of α > 1. Figure 6a represents the intuition of Proposition
3, Figure 6c represents the intuition of Proposition 5, Figure 6b shows the intuition of Proposition 7: what changes in Figure 6a if γ becomes slightly less than 1.
Figure 6: Field Journals as First Choice
Since the reduction in referees’ noisiness improves the utility of submitters, able au-
thors might be more interested in submitting their papers to field journals. However,
since the payoff from publishing a paper in a field journal may be lower than that from
publishing the same paper in a general interest journal (because the readership is lower,
or because the tenure committee thinks so), the most able authors whose papers get pub-
lished with a probability close to 1 would prefer a general interest journal. For less able
authors, lower α is a deterrent for submission, so both effects, noisiness and payoff, dis-
courage submission.
Proposition 7. Among those who submit to both journals sequentially, even in cases of marginal
difference, authors of low ability and authors of a high enough ability prefer to submit to the general
interest journals first. If the difference in publication payoff (γ vs 1) is not too large compared to
the difference in refereeing precision (α vs 1), some authors submit first to field journals. If f(·)
is log-concave, there are two types, θ and θ̄, such that all types θ ∈ (θ, θ̄) submit first to the field
journal, and all types from (−∞, θ) ∪ (θ̄,+∞) prefer to submit to general interest journal first.
Submitting to only one journal, or not submitting at all, might be an even better strat-
egy, but, when α is in the neighborhood of 1, one can invoke Proposition 5 to rule out
single-journal strategies. Figure 6 illustrates: because γ < 1, all authors find submitting
to a field journal worse than to the field journal when the precision of the field journal is
as good as the precision of the general interest journal (Figure 6c). If α < 1 but there is
no penalty, the field journal becomes more attractive to able authors, which follows from
Proposition 3 and is illustrated in Figure 6a. When both change together, there may be
types for which the former effect is smaller than the latter, as in Figure 6b. The contribu-
the following, we study small differences between journals, assuming that both γ and α are close to 1; in this
case, we believe, the intrinsic motivation based on authors’ interest in their own fields dominates potential
payoffs from befriending the editor of the general interest journal. Bardhan (2003), among others, is the
source for our intuition. If one assumes that the field journal’s α is > 1, one can establish a result similar to
our Proposition 7: as long as the change in γ is not too large, authors separate into at least three groups.
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tion of Proposition 7 is to demonstrate that these types, if they exist, constitute an interval
if the difference between journals is not too big. The dotted lines in Figure 6 represent the
case when the referees of the field journal are less precise than the referees of the general
interest journal: the proof of Proposition 5 can be refurbished to demonstrate that, in this
case too, there may be types who prefer to submit to the field journal first, but this would
be a different interval.
Empirically, to test this proposition, one would need data about the submission se-
quences of authors published in both journals (from a survey of authors, from publishers,
or from automated CV collection), and a proxy of authors’ ability, such as solo paper cita-
tions. For junior colleagues, one can look at the first submission outlet for the job market
paper (many candidates include it in their job market CVs) and attempt to correlate this
with placement in 10 years, or any other measure of ability.
Simultaneous Submission In Economics, most journals explicitly require authors to
claim that the article has not been submitted to other journals. In other areas of science,
such as Law, this is not so. With our model, switching to simultaneous submissions will
lower the time costs of the authors (more so if δ is further away from 1, or if the probabil-
ity of acceptance in the first choice journal is low), and all authors would prefer to make
simultaneous submissions, all else being equal. The editors will face competition for the
best papers, enforcing lower turnaround times and competing for readership.
However, lowering the effective time costs will also lower authors’ effort, and will in-
crease the referees’ workload—under sequential submission, all the papers accepted in the
first journal are not considered by the editor in the second journal. This may not translate
into reading each paper twice, since some referees of the first journal might get the same
paper to referee for the second journal. Unless editors coordinate perfectly, simultaneous
submissionwill increase the referees’ workload. The overall payoff for the profession does
not have to be higher as a result.12
3.2 Two Papers, One Journal
Many scholars, including present authors, produce more than one paper at a time. This
allows them to apply their innate abilitymore than once per period, but requires spending
more total effort. This can be interpreted positively (the simultaneously incepted papers
12There are other effects detrimental to the overall quality of the papers beyond the scope of our study
(revision between submission rounds could be useful; the author might want to wait for the replies of all
journals to pick the best, which increases the publication time; and so on).
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Note: PointA represents the effort choice of writing a single paper. PointB represents the total effort when writing two papers, pointC represents the effort per paper.
Figure 7: Effort when Writing Two Papers
do not have to be about the same topic) or negatively (salami slicing). Let us model the
choice to author two papers at a time by postulating the payoff from writing two papers,
spending e of effort per paper, to be13
2 (1− (1− δū)F (q̂ − θ − e))− c(2e),
where we put in an implicit assumption that submitting two papers of equal quality pro-
vides a higher expected utility than submitting one paper of high quality and another of
quality θ. This is true when 1−F (−x) is a concave function of x, which should hold when
x is high, since f(−x) has to decrease eventually, so that
∫ +∞
−∞ f(x) dx has to be equal to 1.
That is, able authors, of high θ+e, are likely to split their efforts equally. In the same spirit,
authors whose θ+ e is small face a locally convex 1−F (−x). If this convexity is not domi-
nated by the convexity of c(e), the less able authors might want to submit two papers: one
with a quality as if they were submitting only one paper, and another of quality θ. If these
authors submit one paper, they will submit two: the second paper comes with no effort
attached. This is also strictly better than submitting only one paper if ū is small enough.
The first-order condition that characterizes e∗2(θ), the effort choice when submitting
two papers, is
[1− δū]f(q̂ − θ − e) = c′(2e). (4)
Figure 7 compares incentiveswhen choosing the effort level ofwriting onepaper against
incentives when choosing the effort level needed to write two papers. When writing one
paper, authors equalizeMB(e) andMC(e), two solid line curves, as on Figure 1a. Their
intersection produces pointA, showing on the abscissa the effort that is spent by an author
of given ability when he chooses to write one paper. When writing two papers, authors
13The implicit assumption here is that writing two papers and sending them to a bad journal yields 2ū of
utility. In case of salami slicing, the utility of having two identical papers unpublished is at most ū.
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equalize the marginal benefit of spending effort on each paper,MB(e), and the marginal
cost of writing each paper,MC(2e). Their intersection produces point C on the abscissa,
which represents effort per paper, and it is clear that point C will always be below point
A becauseMC(2e) > MC(e) by the concavity ofMC(e). To evaluate the total effort spent
by the authors who decide to write two papers, we use point B: it is the abscissa of the
intersection ofMB(e/2) andMC(e), and their intersection clearly coincides with double
the effort represented by point C. Point B can be smaller or larger than point A: authors
of high ability θ find that, when writing two papers, they may have a good chance to pub-
lish both, so they spend more total effort (see Figure 7a). This effect ensues whenMC(2e)
curve intersectsMB(e) closer to its maximum than curveMC(e), which happens for all θ
large enough. At the same time, authors of low ability find that concentrating their efforts
on one paper more than doubles their chances of publishing it, as in Figure 7b, the effect
that can be observedwhenMC(e) intersectsMB(e) closer to themaximumofMB(e) than
MC(2e) does.
Proposition 8. For almost every θ, authors who submit two papers spend less effort per paper
than they would if they submitted only one paper. There is a θ̄ such that the total effort spent by any
author of type θ > θ̄ on writing papers is larger than the amount of effort spent when concentrating
on one paper, and the reverse holds if θ < θ̄.
Effectively, if authors write multiple papers, from the point of view of the editor, it is
as if there were more authors, each exercising less effort because the per-paper effort is
more costly. Which authors prefer to submit a single paper, and which authors prefer to
submit multiple papers?
The able authors, whose θ permits them to hope for a high chance of acceptance, will
submit two papers, harvesting more than 1 in total expected payoff. The less able authors
might find it optimal to submit only one paper, spend all their effort on it, and write the
second one for the bad journal. The total submissions will increase, there will be more
papers, so the right tail of the paper quality distribution may improve. The editor will
have to either raise the acceptance standard or increase the journal’s capacity (special edi-
tions). The first method will discourage submissions from the less able authors, but will,
in general, hurt the utility of authors, in particular of those who author a single paper. The
second method of handling paper proliferation will increase the referee load.
Empirically, an analysis of the CVs of freshly minted PhDs would reveal whether the
market believes that writers of many papers are of high ability. Indeed, job market candi-
dates frequently list their working papers in their CVs. According to our model, authors
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from higher ranked institutions, whose ability is unclear but who are between “high” and
“medium”, on average would have a job market premium for having more working pa-
pers; whereas authors from lower ranked institutions, whose ability is unclear but who
are between “medium” and “low” would benefit from having fewer working papers on
their CV. Again, simply running a linear regression on a clearly nonlinear relationship is
likely to obtain an estimate of an average effect that looks like an insignificant linear effect.
3.3 Coauthorship, One Journal
Many scholars, including the present authors, coauthor papers. They benefit from com-
bining their different backgrounds, sharing their erudition and specializing in tasks. The
single-dimensional ability model that we have can be extended to the decision of collab-
oration: we will assume that two coauthors sacrifice their independent research pursuits
and morph into a single fictitious author. Let the productivity of a collaboration of two
authors with abilities θ1 and θ2 be Θ(θ1, θ2) and let it be increasing in θi. Then each author
will be interested in pairing with a better coauthor. If the matching process is perfect14,
the coauthors will be of equal ability, and their ability will be Θ(θ, θ). We will shut down
the channel of the relative efficiency improvement, and assume that Θ(θ, θ) = θ. If this
assumption does not hold and Θ(θ, θ) > θ, collaboration would be more attractive auto-
matically, since Lemma 2 applies.
The allocation of credit for coauthored papers is an issue in itself. Some credit an au-
thor of a paper withN coauthors with 1/N of credit; some argue that having coauthors is
not a reason to discount publications.15 Here we will assume that each of the two coau-
thors obtains a credit of γ ≤ 1 for single-authored papers.
Let the effort of the two coauthors be expected to be equal. Then, in a symmetric equi-
librium, in collaboration, each author16 spends e∗2(θ) of effort, where e∗2(θ) solves:
e∗2(θ) = argmax
e
γ (1− [1− δū]F (q̂ − θ − e∗2(θ)− e))− c(e).
14Introducing an imperfect matching process is straightforward, but will need additional assumptions.
For instance, the collaboration of the junior faculty member and a well-established professor, unlike our
simpler perfect matching, is quite frequent, but so much richer strategically, that it cannot be contained
in a short extension and warrants a separate study. Uneven sharing of both effort and credit will be part
and parcel of a layer of reputation building, and all these considerations are complementary to our current
model.
15Bikard et al. (2015) estimates the weight to be more corresponding to 1/
√
N than other alternatives.
16This is the Nash equilibrium effort allocation outcome. We abstain from the discussions of first-best
equilibrium outcomes, asymmetric outcomes, and of howwould the results change ifN agents were collab-
orating simultaneously, for brevity.
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Note: On Figures 8b–8d, the intersection of the solid Marginal Benefit (MB) line and the marginal cost (MC) line represents the solo-authoring effort choice for the different values
of θ. Dotted lines represent the change of the marginal benefit (MB) used to obtain coauthorship effort when γ = 1. Dashed MB show what happens when γ < 1.
Figure 8: Effort Solo and Effort in Collaboration
It is easy to establish that e∗2(θ) is single-peaked, and that θ + 2e∗2(θ) is increasing in θ.
The first-order condition for the coauthoring author is:
γ ([1− δū]f(q̂ − θ − 2e∗2(θ))) = c′(e∗2(θ)). (5)
Effectively, in collaboration, the marginal benefits are collected faster: if it makes sense to
increase effort, both authors increase it. This might lead to a smaller effort per person, but
only for higher θ. One can see that argmaxθ e∗2(θ) is smaller than argmaxθ e∗(θ), obtained
from (1). Figure 8 illustrates the per person effort choice.
Effort may be higher in collaboration (Figure 8c). It is trivial to see that the effort per
person is lower for collaborators for high θ even when γ = 1 (Figure 8b). It is somewhat
harder to see that for γ < 1, for small enough θ, the effort per person is lower than the
effort that each partner would spend if working solo (Figure 8d). This allows us to assess
the type of author who is more likely to collaborate.
Proposition 9. For γ < 1, if an author prefers coauthoring, this author’s ability is neither ex-
tremely high nor extremely low. Such authors exist if γ is not too low.
The total quantity of submissions can decrease if some of the collaborating authors
would otherwise submit solo, but may increase if the set of potential collaborators includes
the authors who preferred not to submit. The average quality of submitted and published
papers, net of entry, will increase; the proportion of rejections, net of entry, may decrease,
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because the total effort onmulti-author papers is higher, and therefore the quality of high-
quality papers may increase.
Empirically, many authors have found that there are more coauthors on average in
recent published papers (see Hamermesh (2013), for example). This is in part due to the
change of the profession (such asmore labor-intensive experimentalwork). However, little
research has been conducted onwho is coauthoringwith whom (Bikard et al. (2015) is one
exclusion; networking papers such as Fafchamps et al. (2010) assume that the chance to
collaborate is random). One way to test our proposition would be to study who would
coauthor his or her job market paper with a fellow student; again, to our knowledge, no
one has yet conducted a study of this kind.
4 Discussion
4.1 Feedback from Refereeing
Referees of journals are frequently authors of papers published in the very same journals.
Many factors affect their efficiency; a few interact with submission outcomes.
The refereeing load, which is related to the amount of submissions, is unlikely to im-
prove the referees’ efficiency. The increase in workload, holding the quality of work con-
stant, will make the needed time to finish work longer, and the maintenance of the same
referee report deadline times will reduce the quality of reports. As with any tradeoffs,
most likely a small worsening in both dimensions is going to be optimal. Every result
that leads to an increase in submissions is then likely to increase the noisiness of referee
reports α, or to increase the time costs. Some results are reinforced by this feedback. For
instance, an exogenous increase in α leads to more submissions (see Proposition 3), which
will increase the load of referees.
Thewriting of referee reports and thewriting of the original research is likely to involve
similar human resources. Therefore, a highermarginal cost of the authoring effort is likely
to increase the marginal cost of refereeing effort.
4.2 Policy Implications
Every policy implication will need, besides a good understanding of the author’s motiva-
tion, the understanding of the public benefit from publications, some understanding of
the editor’s motivation, and an understanding of the payoff of the author from the pub-
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lication. The editor is concerned with better readership; society is interested in better
research quality; the author is interested in signaling his own ability and disseminating
his own ideas and results. Every change in the market for publications affects editors’
and authors’ welfare differently: the amount of submissions, the amount of refereeing,
the effort and ability of differently able authors whose work is accepted for publication.
Stronger results can be established with a better understanding about the way that these
factors contribute to society, to the quality of the journal and to the author. For instance,
the editor who maximizes the average quality of papers published in his journal, without
any regard for the benefit to society, can set an extremely high publishing standard: she
can publish one paper in 10 years, but be sure that the average ability is quite high.
Our model enables us to make some statements about the effect on the components of
society, the editor, and the author’s welfare as a result of some of the changes mentioned
above.
More Open-Sourced Journals Many authors (e.g. Bergstrom (2001)) call for more
open-sourced journals, to increase competitionwith for-profit journals, tomotivate shorter
refereeing delays or to drive down the fees for libraries. Assuming that new journals will
recruit the necessary editorial reviewing resources, they will be in the situation of the
second-but-same journal, discussed above: the effort level of themost able authorswill de-
cline, the number of submissions will increase, and higher total capacity will drive down
publication standards. Even if publication standards remain unchanged, having more
journals lowers research effort. To attract the best authors, new journals should generate
higher payoffs from publication than for-profit journals do. Without this, or sabotaging
old journals, however, having more journals in the short run will curtail the incentives of
the most able authors.
Refereeing DelaysMany authors discuss the potential ofmonetary incentives to reduce
refereeing delays (Engers and Gans (1998); Chang and Lai (2001)), treating the delays as
referee’s leisure. However, refereeing is deeply intertwined with publishing, and many
aspects of it are not contractable. Shortening time delays in a way that worsens the quality
of referee reports will benefit only the less able authors; lowering time delays so that the
quality of refereeing is improved will benefit more able authors—and some of them will
exert more effort—potentially improving the quality distribution of publications.17
17One way to achieve the latter is to make it easier to quantify the refereeing impact of a scholar. Admin-
istrators can aggregate information about publications and citations, but not about refereeing engagement.
Some journals provide the names of those who provided a referee report in their annual reports; some jour-
nals have an award for the best referee report; some journals employ their best referees as editors. However,
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Many Referees Obtaining reports from multiple referees provides a better estimate of
a paper’s virtues, but increases the load on the refereeing body, potentially lowering the
quality of the referee reports. Editors can vary the number of referees for any individ-
ual paper, depending on preliminary evaluations: papers sufficiently far away from the
acceptance threshold might get one reviewer to confirm the editor’s preliminary opinion,
whereas papers on the verge of acceptance can havemore reports18, requested sequentially
or simultaneously. The effects on effort are straightforward: those authors who expect
higher scrutiny—the authors whose papers are more likely to be perceived as the ones
near the threshold—will exercise just enough effort to be above the threshold, whereas
those whose outcome is likely to be determined solely by the editor are likely to exert
more effort.
Single-, Double- and Triple-Blind Inferring the paper’s quality from the identity or
affiliation of the author may improve the publication process. It is easier to obtain a signal
of equal quality if more information is available ex ante. This, however, is likely to worsen
the incentive for the referees to acquire information: if the ex ante signal is very persuasive,
why spend time on reading the paper? For these reasons, it may or may not be useful to
inform referees about the identity of the author. One could argue a step further: is it really
necessary for the editor to know the author’s name and affiliation?... 19
5 Conclusion
In our study, we supplied a general model for the publication market. Using it, we rec-
onciled various stylized facts which characterize differences in the publication process in
Economics over time and against other disciplines. The main takeaway message of our
study is that the heterogeneity of authors regarding their ability leads to different effects
of changes in the publication process’s fundamentals. We explain why able authors take
the effectively non-paid refereeing job: they are the ones who benefit from the overall im-
provement of the refereeing technology. The separation of authors into “more able” and
“less able” is endogenous in our model, and it depends on the admission criterion that
the editor applies. Not all separations are monotone: if some authors prefer to submit
to field journals first—even if more valuable general interest journals require the same
many economists do not put their refereeing contribution into their CV: they think the informational content
of a refereeing contribution is not valuable.
18One of the authors is aware of an instance in which 5 referees were employed in a single round.
19Taylor and Yildirim (2011) explore this question.
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cutoff—these authors are likely to be of intermediate ability. Hence, for many changes in
the fundamentals, there are winners and losers. A claim about the inherent benefit of a
change requires an implicit assumption about the comparative importance of the actors
involved in the process.
Our model suggests the empirical consequences of several changes in the academic
publication market, discussed in the introduction. While most of what we study is kept
discreet by the participants of the publication process, such as the sequence of submis-
sions, identities of referees, referees’ recommendations and editors’ priors, the empirical
literature can proxy some unobservables with observables. For instance, the measure of
paper quality can be proxied with citations (as Bikard et al. (2015) do); the ability may be
deduced from citations of solo papers written in a given year (after all, the absolute value
of ability does not matter that much) or average performance across years (as Fafchamps
et al. (2010) do); and the individual effort may be measured by time spent on rewriting,
which can be obtained from surveys. Submission sequence decisions can be observed in
CVs if they are updated frequently enough, or obtained from big publishers. An interest-
ing source of the empirical data, it seems, are the CVs of freshly-minted PhDs: they clearly
indicate where they submit their jobmarket papers (and inmany cases, these are first sub-
missions), they show the number of working papers and the number of their coauthors,
and they have little individual reputation besides affiliation.
Our model does not impose much structure on the underlying institutional processes,
and its predictions can be applied directly to other contexts where agents compete for
limited slots. For instance, job market applicants exert effort to overcome an interviewer’s
expectations regarding acceptable candidates. A model similar to ours will predict in this
context that most effort will be exerted by applicants marginally below the acceptance
threshold, which in turn has implications on the duration of a job market search. Other
contexts include advertising, political competition, start-up businesses soliciting venture
funding, real estate agents actively pushing their properties, and courtship in the marital
market—any context where effort is needed to overcome the threshold for acceptance will
inherit the intuition we provide in our model.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1. Themonotonicity of the optimal effort corresponds directly to the monotonicity
of f(·). When the solution of (1) is unique, the proof is immediate from Figures 1b and
1c (dotted lines show what happens to theMB(e) curve when θ increases). If for some θ
optimal effort started to decline with θ, it will be declining for θ′ > θ by single-peakedness
of f(·), and for the same reason if for some θ optimal effort increases with θ, it will increase
for θ′ < θ.
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Let there be two global maxima of
U(e|θ) = 1− [1− δū]F
(
q̂ − θ − e
α
)
− c(e)
when θ = θ̄. Generically, the continuity of derivatives ofU(e|θ)with respect to all variables
implies that there are at least two local maxima of U(e|θ) in the neighborhood of θ = θ̄.
Let e1(θ) and e2(θ) be locations of two local maxima of the Effort Choice Problem such that
e1(θ̄) < e2(θ̄), and both e = e1(θ̄) and e = e2(θ̄) maximize U(e) for θ = θ̄.
By the Envelope theorem and because Equation (1) should hold at both e1(θ̄) and e2(θ̄),
∂
∂θ
U(ei(θ)|θ)|θ=θ̄ = c′(ei(θ̄)) for i = {1, 2}.
By strict convexity of c(·), this implies thatU(e1(θ)) > U(e2(θ)) for θ < θ̄, andU(e1(θ)) <
U(e2(θ)) for θ > θ̄.
Because c′(·) is increasing in its argument, themaximum effort corresponds to themax-
imummarginal cost of e. Since marginal benefit is bounded by 1−δū
α
f(0), maximum effort
must be exercised by an agent for which q̂ − θ − e(θ) = 0, if there is such a θ. If not, it
means that for some θ, there are two solutions to the Effort Choice Problem, one that de-
livers θ+e(θ) < q̂, and another one that makes θ+e(θ) > q̂; effort increases for all θ smaller
than this one, and declines for all θ larger than this one.
Lemma 2. When the solution of the effort choice problem is not unique, it means that an
increase in θ comes with a jump upwards in e∗(θ), according to Lemma 1. When the so-
lution of the effort choice problem is unique, we can apply the implicit function theorem.
Differentiate (1) with respect to θ:
−1− δū
α2
f ′
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)(
1 +
de∗(θ)
dθ
)
= c′′(e∗(θ))
de∗(θ)
dθ
.
The derivative of θ + e∗(θ) is
1 +
de∗(θ)
dθ
= 1 +
−1−δū
α2
f ′
(
q̂−θ−e∗(θ)
α
)
c′′(e∗(θ)) + 1−δū
α2
f ′
(
q̂−θ−e∗(θ)
α
) = c′′(e∗(θ))
c′′(e∗(θ)) + 1−δū
α2
f ′
(
q̂−θ−e∗(θ)
α
) .
The denominator is positive because of the second order condition (2), the whole fraction
is positive because c(·) is convex.
Proposition 1. The change in q̂ is mathematically the same as the change in θ, except that
the sign is reversed. The single-peakedness of effort yields the result about the change in
effort. Observe that q̂−θ determines the level of effort. The chance to publish is monotone
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in q̂ − θ − e∗(θ|q̂), and for the reason for which θ + e∗(θ) is increasing in θ, q̂ − e∗(θ|q̂) is
decreasing in q̂ (see the proof of Lemma 2). The utility part of the statement is obtained
with the Envelope theorem.
Proposition 2. Consider first the effects of the changes in δ and ū on effort choice. Since
(1) depends on the product of δ and ū, establishing the result for δ would be sufficient.
Differentiate (1) completely with respect to δ:
− ū
α
f
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
+
(
1− δū
α2
f ′
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
))(
−∂e
∗(θ)
∂δ
)
= c′′(e∗(θ))
∂e∗(θ)
∂δ
⇒
∂e∗(θ)
∂δ
=
− ū
α
f
(
q̂−θ−e∗(θ)
α
)
c′′(e∗(θ)) +
1− δū
α2
f ′
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 because it’s SOC (2)
< 0.
Simultaneously, the Envelope theorem suggests that authors are better off:
∂
∂δ
(
1− [1− δū]F
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
− c(e∗(θ))
)
= ūF
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
∈ [0, 1).
The derivative is equal to zero if and only if ū = 0.
Lower effort implies lower chances to publish immediately.
The paper gets submitted if
1− [1− δū]F
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
− c(e∗(θ)) ≥ ū.
Notice that the right-hand side increases one-to-one with ū, and does not change with δ.
Since the left-hand side increases more slowly than one-to-one, the result follows.
Proposition 3. Efforts The increase in α “flattens” the distribution (see Figure 2a) just as an
increase in δ lowered efforts, but it also “stretches” the pdf. Let t = q̂−θ−e
∗(θ)
α
. Differentiate
completely (1) to obtain:
1− δū
α2
(
−f ′(t)∂e
∗(θ)
∂α
− f(t)− f ′(t)t
)
= c′′(e∗(θ))
∂e∗(θ)
∂α
⇒
∂e∗(θ)
∂α
= −1− δū
α2
f( q̂−θ−e
∗(θ)
α
) + f ′( q̂−θ−e
∗(θ)
α
) q̂−θ−e
∗(θ)
α
c′′(e∗(θ)) +
1− δū
α2
f ′(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive because it’s SOC (2)
.
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Thus, the sign of ∂e
∗(θ)
∂α
opposes the sign of (tf(t))′t. This transformation from θ to t
is monotone because of Lemma 2. Since f(·) is differentiable, and has a maximum at 0,
f ′(0) = 0. Effort thus decreases when θ = θ0, and, by the differentiability of tf(t), in the
neighborhood of θ0 as well. It is easy to see that there is at least one intersection to the left
and to the right of the center: increasingα does not change the probability of publication at
q̃ = q̂ (that is, for θ0 type). Therefore, the stretched and non-stretched distributions should
integrate to the same value at q̂ − θ0 − e∗(θ0) = 0, and therefore it must be the case that
they intersect at least once to the left and at least once to the right from q̃ = q̂. This means
that there are sets of positive measure in both (−∞, θ0] and [θ0,+∞) where the stretched
density is above the original density.
If ε has a mean, tf(t) should converge to zero from above when approaching infinity,
and from below when approaching minus infinity, to integrate to something finite. This
implies that (tf(t))′ < 0 for both very high and very low t values, and thus effort increases
for the “too high” and “too low” values of θ.
Finally, consider tf(t) at t > 0. Observe that tf(t) is strictly log-concave whenever f(t)
is strictly log-concave; thus, there is a unique argmaximum. Denote this argmaximum by
t1. Then tf(t) is increasing from 0 to t1, and decreasing afterwards. Define θ̌1 as follows:
q̂ − θ̌1 − e∗(θ̌1)
α
= t1.
For all θ ∈ [θ̌1, θ0), the corresponding value of q̂−θ−e
∗(θ)
α
∈ [0, t1], and therefore for these θ,
effort choice declines. Similarly, for all θ below θ̌, effort choice increases.
Analogously, consider −tf(t) at t < 0. Observe that tf(t) is strictly log-concave when-
ever f(t) is strictly log-concave, and obtain t2 as the argmaximum of −tf(t). Solve for
θ̂1:
q̂ − θ̂1 − e∗(θ̂1)
α
= t2.
Therefore, effort increases for types θ ∈ (−∞, θ̌1) ∪ (θ̂1,+∞), declines for θ ∈ (θ̌1, θ̂1),
and remains the same for θ ∈ {θ̌1, θ̂1}.
Utility The Envelope theorem provides
∂
∂α
(
1− [1− δū]F
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
− c(e∗(θ))
)
=
1− δū
α2
(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)) f
(
q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)
α
)
.
The sign of the derivative coincides with the sign of q̂ − θ − e∗(θ). When θ > θ0, the
derivative is negative, and it is positive otherwise.
When θ0 > θ̂, the author type who swung indifferently between submission to the
good journal and sending his papers directly to the bad journal, encounters an increase in
α, he starts strictly preferring to submit his paper to the good journal. By continuity of the
32
maximized utility, the author types in the left neighborhood of this type start submitting,
too, which leads to more submissions than before. The case for θ̂ > θ0 is proven similarly.
Proposition 4. Compare Equations (1) and (1’). Their difference is in the marginal benefit
component, in the square bracket part left of f(·). Since F (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)) decreases in θ,
1− δ + 2δF (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))[1− δū] decreases in θ too. Consider the limits:
lim
θ→−∞
1− δ + 2δF (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))[1− δū] = 1 + δ − 2δ2ū > 1− δū,
lim
θ→+∞
1− δ + 2δF (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))[1− δū] = 1− δ < 1− δū.
Ignoring jumps in e∗(θ), by the intermediate value theorem, there is θ1 where
1− δ + 2δF (q̂ − θ1 − e∗(θ1))[1− δū] = 1− δū,
and by the monotonicity of the left-hand side, it is unique. The agent of this type will
choose the same effort level in both worlds, one journal or two journals. Therefore, θ1 is
such that
θ1 : F (q̂ − θ1 − e∗(θ1)) =
1
2
1− ū
1− δū
.
For all θ < θ1, the marginal benefit of effort in the scenario with two journals is higher than
the marginal benefit in the scenario with only one journal: even though getting published
in one place is unlikely, with two journals, the chances of getting accepted somewhere im-
prove. At the same time, for θ > θ1, the insurance motive for exercising effort is weaker,
and these authors spend less effort in the scenario with two journals.
Since F (q̂ − θ1 − e∗(θ1)) = 12
1−ū
1−δū , the author whose chance of publication is 1/2 will
reduce his effort, as will all authors of higher ability, and some authors whose ability is
lower than this.
Proposition 5. Assume submitting to Journal 2 is better than abstaining:
γ(1− F ) + Fδū− c(e) ≥ ū,
where F = F (q̂ − θ − e) ∈ (0, 1) for any e. Then using the same effort provides a higher
utility, if one attempts resubmission to Journal 1:
γ(1− F ) + Fδ
>ū+c(e)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− F + Fδū)−c(e) = γ(1− F ) + Fū− c(e) ≥ γ(1− F ) + Fδū− c(e)ū.
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Finally, observe that sending first to Journal 1 is strictly better:
1−F+Fδ (γ(1− F ) + Fδū)−c(e) =
Utility of submitting to 2 first︷ ︸︸ ︷
γ(1− F ) + Fδ (1− F + Fδu)− c(e) +γ(1−F )(1−Fδ).
However, some authors may find it optimal to not resubmit if they get a rejection after
submission to Journal 1. Let e∗∗(θ) solve
max
e
1− F (q̂ − θ − e) + F (q̂ − θ − e)δmax {ū, γ(1− F (q̂ − θ − e) + F (q̂ − θ − e)δū} − c(e).
For simplicity, let us agree thatwhen the author type swings indifferently between (re)submitting
and sending the paper to a bad journal, the author chooses ū. e∗∗(θ) is positive and well-
defined because the payoff is continuous in e and bounded, c is convex and c′(0) = 0. The
first-order condition of this problem is (omitting q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ) for brevity):
c′(e) = f(·)[1−δūmax {ū, γ(1− F (·) + F (·)δū}]+F (·)
Q(θ+e∗∗(θ))︷ ︸︸ ︷[
0,ū ≥ γ(1− F (·) + F (·)δū,
(γ − δū)f(·),ū < γ(1− F (·) + F (·)δū.
Besides jumps due tomultiple solutions of the FOC as discussed in Lemma 1 (and handled
similarly), there may be jumps due to a discontinuity in the right part of the marginal
benefit function Q(·). Consider
θ∗∗0 :

ū ≥ lim
θ→θ∗∗0 −
γ(1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ)) + F (q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ))δū,
ū ≤ lim
θ→θ∗∗0 +
γ(1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ)) + F (q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ))δū.
Q(θ + e∗∗(θ)) is continuous and equal to zero to the left from θ∗∗0 . For every point in the
right neighborhood of θ∗∗0 , the marginal benefit function jumps up due to a discontinuity
in Q(·); therefore, every point in the right neighborhood of θ∗∗0 has e∗∗(θ) > e∗∗(θ∗∗0 ).
Similarly to Lemma 2, we can take the second-order condition of the optimization prob-
lemwhich defines e∗∗(θ), and observe that everywhere where there are no jumps in e∗∗(θ),
1 + de
∗∗(θ)
dθ
= c
′′(e∗∗(θ)
SOC
> 0. Therefore, the total quality of the submitted paper in this frame-
work, θ + e∗∗(θ), is increasing in θ.
It is trivial to establish that γ(1 − F (−z) + F (−z)δū is increasing in z, and thus the
monotonicity of θ + e∗∗(θ) implies that θ∗∗0 is single-valued for γ > ū, and not present if
γ < ū. Similarly, define
θ∗∗1 :

ū ≥ lim
θ→θ∗∗1 −
1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ) + F (q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ))δū− c(e∗∗(θ)),
ū ≤ lim
θ→θ∗∗1 +
1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ) + F (q̂ − θ − e∗∗(θ))δū− c(e∗∗(θ)).
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Without the c(e∗∗(θ)) part, because γ < 1, we would have θ∗∗1 ≤ θ∗∗0 . Because we have
the c() part, θ∗∗1 becomes larger, and, depending upon the shapes of f(·) and c(·), might
become larger than θ∗∗0 . If this is the case, all authors below θ∗∗1 submit to Journal 1, and
resubmit to Journal 2 if they were rejected, and all authors below θ∗∗1 submit to the bad
journal immediately. If θ∗∗1 < θ∗∗0 , all agents to the right of θ∗∗0 would attempt to resubmit
their papers to Journal 2 if they don’t get accepted in Journal 1. All agents to the left of θ∗∗1
would not even attempt to submit to Journal 1. Finally, all agents in (θ∗∗1 , θ∗∗0 ) will submit
to Journal 1, but will not try to resubmit to Journal 2.
To establish whether θ∗∗1 is smaller than θ∗∗0 , observe that in this case, for θ∗∗1
1− F1 + F1δū− c1 = ū,
where c1 = c(e∗(θ̌)), e∗(·) solves (1), and F1 = F (q̂ − θ∗∗1 − e∗(θ∗∗1 )). If this author gets a
rejection from Journal 1, he finds it optimal to resubmit to the second journal if
γ(1− F1) + F1δū ≥ ū.
Obviously, if γ < ū, this never holds. When γ > ū, this inequality, after substitution of the
indifference condition to remove F1, produces
γ − ū
γ − δū
≤ 1− ū− c1
1− δū
,
which holds if γ ≥ 1−δ+δc1
ū(1−δ)+c1 ū ∈ (ū, 1).
20 If γ is not high enough, θ∗∗1 type will have some
agents in the right neighborhood of θ∗∗1 who submit to Journal 1, but do not resubmit to
Journal 2 afterwards, which implies that θ∗∗0 is far enough to the right of θ∗∗1 .
Proposition 6. Local case Consider the choice between submitting first to Journal 1, then
to Journal 2 (strategy 1), and submitting first to Journal 2, then to Journal 1 (strategy 2).
Consider the effort choice problem when choosing strategy i; let e∗i (θ) denote the effort
chosen by the author of type θ.
The utility from submitting to Journal 1 first is U1 =
1−F (q̂1−θ−e∗1(θ))+F (q̂1−θ−e∗1(θ))δ (γ(1− F (q̂2 − θ − e∗1(θ))) + F (q̂2 − θ − e∗1(θ))δū)−c(e∗1(θ)).
The utility from submitting to Journal 2 first is U2 =
γ(1−F (q̂2−θ−e∗2(θ)))+F (q̂2−θ−e∗2(θ))δ (1− F (q̂1 − θ − e∗2(θ)) + F (q̂1 − θ − e∗2(θ))δū)−c(e∗2(θ)).
20The fraction is decreasing in c1, the smallest possible c1 is 0, and the largest possible c1 is 1− ū.
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When γ = 1 and q̂2 = q̂1, e∗1(θ) = e∗2(θ) = e∗(θ), and U1(θ) = U2(θ). Consider a small
change in γ at γ = 1 and q̂1 = q̂2 = q̂:
dU1
dγ
= δF (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))(1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))) > 0.
dU2
dγ
= 1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)) > 0.
As in Proposition 5, lowering γ makes submitting to Journal 2 first a strictly dominated
strategy for every ability level:
d(U1 − U2)
dγ
= (1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))) (δF (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))− 1) < 0.
Consider a small change in q̂2, the admission standard of Journal 2:
dU1
dq̂2
= δF (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))(δū− 1)f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)) < 0.
dU2
dq̂2
= (δ [1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)) + F (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))δū]− 1)f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)) < 0.
Lowering q̂2 makes submitting to Journal 1 first a strictly dominated strategy:
d(U1 − U2)
dq̂2
= f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))[1− δ] > 0.
Tomodel a simultaneous decrease in q̂2 and γ, express the relative change in q̂2 with λ > 0,
and consider
−d(U1 − U2)
dγ
+ λ
−d(U1 − U2)
dq̂2
= (1− F (·))(1− δF (·))− λf(·)[1− δ].
Strategy 1 is better than strategy 2 if this derivative is positive:
[1− δ]λ < 1− F (q̂ − θ − e
∗(θ))
f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))
[1− δF (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))].
By the log-concavity of f(·), [1 − F (·)]/f(·) is decreasing. The product of two decreas-
ing positive functions is decreasing, and therefore the inequality above holds for a small
enough q − θ − e∗(θ). By the monotonicity of θ + e∗(θ), there will be a threshold level of θ
such that all authors of ability higher than this will submit to Journal 1 first, and the rest
will submit to Journal 2 first.
Non-local case Consider a family of journals parameterized by t such that the success-
ful publication pays off t utility, and the signal threshold enforced by the editor of Journal
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t is q̂(t). Consider the problem of choice between submitting to the stronger Journal t and
the weaker Journal t′ that has a marginally smaller payoff and marginally lower threshold.
Let e∗i (θ) denote the solution to the effort choice problem for author θ that submits first to
the Journal i ∈ {s, w}, and then to the journal {s, w} \ {i}. The utility that the author of
type θ derived from submitting to the stronger journal first is
Us = t(1− F (q̂(t)− θ − e∗s(θ)))+
+ F (q̂(t)− θ − e∗s(θ))δ (t′(1− F (q̂(t′)− θ − e∗s(θ)))F (q̂(t′)− θ − e∗s(θ))δū)− c(e∗s(θ)).
The utility for the author of type θ derived from submitting to the weaker journal first
is
Uw = t
′(1− F (q̂(t′)− θ − e∗w(θ)))+
+ F (q̂(t′)− θ − e∗w(θ))δ (t(1− F (q̂(t)− θ − e∗w(θ)))F (q̂(t)− θ − e∗w(θ))δū)− c(e∗w(θ)).
When t = t′, e∗w(θ) = e∗s(θ) = e∗(t, q̂(t)− θ), and all authors are indifferent over submit-
ting first to Journal s or Journal w, the local case argument above suggests that there is a
type θ̄ who is indifferent as to journals s and w when
q̂′(t) =
1− F (q̂(t)− θ̄ − e∗(t, q̂(t)− θ̄))
f(q̂(t)− θ̄ − e∗(t, q̂(t)− θ̄))
1− δF (q̂(t)− θ̄ − e∗(t, q(t)− θ̄))
t(1− δ)
= Q(t, q̂ − θ̄|e∗).
Pick an author type θ̄. Can we “guide” q(t) from t = γ to t = 1 so that type θ̄ is
indifferent to all journals along this path? This would make that type indifferent to both
our original Journals 1 and 2. To locate this type, we solve a parameterized initial value
problem:
q̂′(t) = Q(t, q̂(t)− θ̄|e∗), q̂(γ) = q̂2. (6)
We want to pick θ̄ so that q̂(1|θ̄) = q̂1. First, observe that
1− F (q̂(t)− θ̄ − e∗(t, q̂(t)− θ̄))
f(q̂(t)− θ̄ − e∗(t, q̂(t)− θ̄))
1− δF (q̂(t)− θ̄)
t(1− δ)
>
1− F (q̂1 − θ̄)
f(q̂1 − θ̄)
1− δF (q̂1 − θ̄)
1− δ
,
and if one picks θ̄ low enough so that the right-hand side is equal to q̂1−q̂2
1−γ , the integral
above is strictly above q̂1 − q̂2. Denote this θ̄ as θ̄l. On the other hand,
1− F (q̂(t)− θ̄ − e∗(t, q̂(t)− θ̄))
f(q̂(t)− θ̄ − e∗(t, q̂(t)− θ̄))
1− δF (q̂(t)− θ̄)
t(1− δ)
<
1− F (q̂2 − θ̄ − E)
f(q̂2 − θ̄ − E)
1− δF (q̂2 − θ̄ − E)
γ(1− δ)
,
where E solves c(E) = 1: this would be a natural cap to the level of effort. Therefore,
there is a θ̄ high enough so that the right-hand side is equal to q̂1−q̂2
1−γ , and the integral
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above yields strictly less than q̂1 − q̂2. Denote this θ̄ as θ̄h. These two values, θ̄l and θ̄h,
provide boundaries on potentially relevant values of θ̄.
If e∗(·) has jumps, Q(·|e∗) may have jumps, too. Observe that P (t, x) = Q(t, x|e∗) is
monotone and decreasing in x. Denote p = q̂ − θ̄, then ODE (6) changes to
p′ = P (t, p), p(γ) = q̂2 − θ̄.
Denote the solution of this ODE p(t|θ̄). If for some t′, P (t′, p(t′|θ̄)) = P (t′, p(t′|θ̄′)), by
the monotonicity of P (t, ·) this implies that p(t′|θ̄) = p(t′|θ̄′), which in turn implies that
p(t|θ̄) = p(t|θ̄′) holds for all t, because they solve the same ODE with the same starting
point. Because P (t, p) is monotone in the second argument, p′(t|θ̄) < p′(t|θ̄′) for all t,
which means that
p(1|θ̄′) + θ̄ = q̂2 +
∫ 1
γ
P (t, p(t|θ̄′))dt > q̂2 +
∫ 1
γ
P (t, p(t|θ̄))dt = p(1|θ̄) + θ̄.
Therefore, q̂(1|θ̄) is increasing in θ̄, which means it has countably many discontinuities.
If for some θ̄∗, q̂(1|θ̄∗) = q̂1, we have found our separation candidate type: this θ̄∗ type
is indifferent to all the stronger and weaker journals along the path of (t, q(t)), and there-
fore this type is indifferent to both Strategies 1 and 2, while all types above strictly prefer
submitting to stronger journals first, and all types below prefer submitting to weaker jour-
nals first. If there is no such θ̄∗, there must be a θ̄∗ for which q̂(1|θ̄) is taking a jump, and
limθ̄→θ̄∗− q̂(1|θ̄) < q̂1 < limθ̄→θ̄∗+ q̂(1|θ̄). This θ̄∗ is the separation type we are looking for:
• all types below θ̄∗ would weakly prefer publishing in weaker journals to publishing
in stronger journals, and therefore would prefer Strategy 2, if the publication cutoff
in Journal 1 was limθ̄→θ̄∗− q(1|θ̄), somewhat lower than the one we are looking for;
• all types above θ̄∗ would weakly prefer Strategy 1 even if the publication cutoff in
Journal 1 was limθ̄→θ̄∗+ q(1|θ̄) > q̂1;
• since d(U1−U2)
dq̂1
< 1, preferences over strategies above hold strictly instead ofweakly for
the true level of q̂1:
U1(θ) > U2(θ)⇔ θ > θ̄, U1(θ) < U2(θ)⇔ θ < θ̄.
By the continuity of U1(θ) and U2(θ), U1(θ̄∗) = U2(θ̄∗).
Proposition 7. Local case Follow Figure 6 for illustration. Consider the choice between sub-
mitting first to a general interest journal, and then to field (strategy 1), versus submitting to
a field journal, and then to general interest (strategy 2). Consider the effort choice problem
when choosing strategy i; let e∗i (θ) denote the effort chosen by the author of type θ.
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The utility from following strategy 1 is U1(θ) = −c(e∗1(θ))+
+1−F (q̂−θ−e∗1(θ))+F (q̂−θ−e∗1(θ))δ
(
γ
(
1− F
(
q̂ − θ − e∗1(θ)
α
))
+ F
(
q̂ − θ − e∗1(θ)
α
)
δū
)
.
The utility from following strategy 2 is U2(θ) = −c(e∗2(θ))+
+γ
(
1− F
(
q̂ − θ − e∗2(θ)
α
))
+F
(
q̂ − θ − e∗2(θ)
α
)
δ (1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗2(θ)) + F (q̂ − θ − e∗2(θ))δū) .
Assume γ = 1 and α = 1, then e∗1(θ) = e∗2(θ) = e∗(θ), and both submission strategies are
equally attractive. Consider the difference of the utility from the first submission strategy
and the utility from the second submission strategy. Take a derivative with respect to α:
d
dα
(U1 − U2)|α=1 = −(γ − δ) [q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)] f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)).
Since θ + e∗(θ) is increasing, the sign of [q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)] determines the sign of the whole
expression. When θ is high enough, the whole expression is negative: able authors prefer
submitting to a field journal.
Consider now a change in γ:
d
dγ
(U1 − U2)|γ=1 = −(1− F (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)))(1− δF (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))).
To model the simultaneous decrease in α and γ, express the relative change in α with
λ > 0, and consider
−d
dγ
(U1 − U2) + λ
−d
dα
(U1 − U2)|α=γ=1 = (1− F (x))(1− δF (x)) + λ[1− δ]xf(x),
where x = q̂ − θ − e(θ). Authors of positive x (that is, with θ + e∗(θ) < q̂) will prefer to
pursue strategy 1 for every λ.
Take x̄ < 0, and pick λ > λ̄, where
λ̄ =
(1− δF (x))(1− F (x))
xf(x)(1− δ)
> 0.
For this λ, agents in the neighborhood of x̄ prefer strategy 2. Even so, as x→ −∞ (that
is, as θ → +∞),
−d
dγ
(U1 − U2) + λ
−d
dα
(U1 − U2)|α=γ=1 =
→1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− F (x))
→1︷ ︸︸ ︷
[1− δF (x)] +λ
→0︷ ︸︸ ︷
xf(x) > 0,
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since xf(x) has to converge to 0 so that ε has a mean. Therefore, for every λ, least- and
most-able authors prefer submitting to the general interest journal first.
Non-local case For θ large enough, the probability of publishing in either journal is
arbitrarily close to 1. This makes the payoff from submitting to the general interest journal
approach 1, while the payoff from submitting to the field journal approaches to γ < 1.
Therefore, by continuity authors of high enough ability prefer to submit to the general
interest journal first.
From the local case proof, we know that type θ̄ = q̂ − E, where E solves c(E) = 1, no
matter what the chosen effort level, has q̂ − θ̄ + E − e∗(θ̄) = E − e∗(θ̄) > 0, and therefore
for every t, all authors of ability less than q̂ − E prefer to submit to the general interest
journal.
Under log-concavity of f(·), one can show that− xf(x)
(1−δF (x))(1−F (x)) has a unique extremum,
and it is a maximum. Regardless of log-concavity, this fraction is positive at (−∞, 0); it is
equal to 0 at x = 0; it converges to 0 as x→ −∞ because ε has a finite mean, and therefore
by the intermediate value theorem, there is an extremum in (−∞, 0), and there is at least
one maximum. The derivative of this fraction provides a first-order condition:
−f(x)− xf ′(x)
(1− δF (x))(1− F (x))
− xf
2(x)(1 + δ − 2δF (x)
(1− δF (x))2(1− F (x))2
= 0⇒
⇒ 1 + xf
′(x)
f(x)
+
original fraction︷ ︸︸ ︷
xf(x)
(1− δF (x))(1− F (x))
(1 + δ − 2δF (x)) = 0.
Assume that there is more than one x that solves the equation above. Because f ′(0) = 0,
f ′(x)/f(x) is positive; because of log-concavity, f ′(x)/f(x) is decreasing; and therefore
xf ′(x)/f(x) is increasing and negative21 when x < 0, including the points that solve the
FOC. Take a derivative with respect to x:
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 + x
f ′(x)
f(x)
)′+
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
xf(x)
(1− δF (x))(1− F (x))
)′
(1+δ−2δF (x))+
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
xf(x)
(1− δF (x))(1− F (x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(−2δf(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
The fraction xf(x)
(1−δF (x))(1−F (x)) has a slope of 0 at our chosen solutions of the FOC because
of the way that we choose the points of evaluation: after all, these values are exactly the
extrema of xf(x)
(1−δF (x))(1−F (x)) ! Therefore, our continuous FOC at all zeros has the same slope
sign, which implies that there is exactly one FOC solution, which must be a maximum.
21The log-concavity is obviously beyond what is necessary to get this.
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Because of the single-peakedness of− xf(x)
(1−F (x)(1−δF (x)) ,
−d
dγ
(U1−U2)+λ−ddα (U1−U2)|α=γ=1 =
=
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− F (x))(1− δF (x))λ
[
1
λ
+
xf(x)
(1− δF (x))(1− F (x))
]
,
where, as before, x is the shorthand notation for q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)). In order to obtain the
existence of types that prefer submission to field journals first, one needs
λ > min
x
(1− δF (x))(1− F (x))
−xf(x)
.
By the single-peakedness of −xf(x)
(1−δF (x))(1−F (x)) , every large enough λ produces three intervals
of x: one bounded, (x, x̄), where λ > (1−δF (x))(1−F (x))−xf(x) for all x ∈ (x, x̄), and two complemen-
tary unbounded ones. At θ̄ and θ, corresponding to x and x̄, authors swing indifferently
between two strategies.
Proposition 8. Compare (1) and (4). Observe that c′(2e) > c′(e), and therefore the per-paper
effort has to be lower when two papers are written and submitted.
To calculate the total effort, denote E = 2e. Rewrite (4) as
[1− δū]f(q̂ − θ − E/2) = c′(E). (4’)
The right-hand sides of (1) and (4’) coincide. The left-hand sides are different only by
the argument of f(·).
For single-peaked f(·), the nonzero intersection of f(q̂ − θ − e) and f(q̂ − θ − e/2) is
unique; denote it ē(θ). It exists for small θ, where f ′(q̂ − θ) > 0. If it does not exist, the
marginal benefit of effort when writing two papers is always greater than the marginal
benefit of effort when concentrating on one paper. Therefore, for author types of θ ≥ q̂,
the total effort of writing two papers is greater than the total effort fromwriting one paper.
Consider θ < q̂. When ē(θ) > 0, one can get it by solving:
f(q̂ − θ − ē(θ)) = f(q̂ − θ − ē(θ)
2
).
Taking a derivative with respect to θ yields
∂ē(θ)
∂θ
= −
f ′(q̂ − θ − ē(θ))− f ′(q̂ − θ − ē(θ)
2
)
f ′(q̂ − θ − ē(θ))− 1
2
f ′(q̂ − θ − ē(θ)
2
)
= −1−
−1
2
f ′(q̂ − θ − ē(θ)
2
)
f ′(q̂ − θ − ē(θ))− 1
2
f ′(q̂ − θ − ē(θ)
2
)
.
Since f(q̂−θ−e) and f(q̂−θ−e/2) are both single-peakedwith respect to ewithmaxima
at positive values, and the maximum of the latter is to the of from the maximum of the
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former, the intersectionmust have a f ′(q̂−θ− ē(θ)
2
) < 0 and f ′(q̂−θ− ē(θ)) > 0. This makes
the fraction above negative, and therefore a decrease in θ increases ē(θ). Therefore, there is
at most unique point θ̄ such that e∗(θ̄) = ē(θ̄): total effort is the same for authors of ability
θ = θ̄, whether they write one or two papers. It exists because for θm = argmaxe e∗(θ),
ē(θm) > e
∗(θm), and ē(θ) is continuous.
θ̄makes it possible to compare the size of the total effort required for concentrating on
one paper with the required effort for working on two papers. If θ < θ̄, the intersection
of the marginal benefit curves is to the right of the c′(e) curve, as on Figure 7b, which
makes f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)) > f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)/2), and therefore the effort from concentrating
on one paper is greater than the total effort from working on two papers. Otherwise, the
intersection of the marginal benefit curves is to the left of the c′(e) curve, as in Figure 7a,
f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)) < f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ)/2), and therefore the effort from concentrating on one
paper is less than the total effort from working on two papers.
Proposition 9. It is trivial to establish that every author prefers working solo if γ is close to
0. For γ = 1, all authors strictly prefer publishing in collaboration: the coauthor’s effort in
this case is a free increase of θ. By continuity, when γ < 1, but close to 1, there are authors
who would prefer to coauthor papers. For every γ < 1, there is an author with θ so high
that their expected utility when publishing solo is at least γ. These authors would prefer
publishing solo. By the continuity of the utility functions with respect to θ, there must
be an author type who swings indifferently between submitting solo-written paper and
coauthoring. Obviously, the higher is γ, the higher should be θ of the indifferent author:22
The utility of coauthorship is monotonewith respect to γ, and the utility of solo authorship
is not dependent upon γ.
Take γ high enough (but still below 1), so that the θ of the indifferent author is above
argmaxθ e∗(θ). The marginal utility of an increase in θ for the strategy of solo publication
of this indifferent author is
d
dθ
(1− [1− δū])F (q̂ − θ − e∗(θ))− c(e∗(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
U1(θ)
= [1− δū]f(q̂ − θ − e∗(θ) = c′(e∗(θ)),
where the first equality is from the Envelope theorem, and the second one is from the
first-order condition (we cannot hit a place where the jump happens because the marginal
benefit is locally declining). The marginal utility of coauthored publication is
d
dθ
(1− [1− δū])F (q̂ − θ − 2e∗2(θ))− c(e∗2(θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2(θ)
= [1− δū]f(q̂− θ−2e∗2(θ)[1 +
de∗2
dθ︸︷︷︸
<0
] < c′(e∗2(θ)).
22If there is more than one indifferent author types, here we mean the one with the largest θ.
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de∗2
dθ
< 0 by the single-peakedness of the effort, and because the per-person effort peak
for collaboration happens for a lower θ than for solo attempts, which is lower than the
θ for the indifferent highly-able author. Since θ is high enough, e∗(θ) > e∗2(θ), which by
the monotonicity of c′() implies that c′(e∗(θ)) > c′(e∗2(θ)), and therefore the author with
somewhat higher θ will strictly prefer solo publication to coauthorship, and the reverse
will hold for θ that is somewhat smaller than the indifferent agent. By the continuity of U1
and U2, there is an open interval to the left of the indifferent author where collaboration
yields higher utility than solo authoring.
We have established the existence of authors who prefer to collaborate when γ < 1, but
still large. To finish the proof, we will show that for every γ < 1 there is a small enough θ
such that for all smaller ability levels, e∗(θ) > e∗2(θ). Take θ̌ such that e∗(θ̂) = e∗2(θ̂). There
are at least two of such points: one is between the peaks of e∗(·) and e∗2(·), and another one
appearswhen γ < 1, when θ is small enough so that f(q̂−θ−e) is increasing in e at e = e∗(θ)
(such as the one plotted at Figure 8d). Let θ̌ be the smaller one. For every θ smaller than
θ̌, e∗(θ) > e∗2(θ); the only caveat remaining to handle is the case of multiple intersections
of the MB and MC functions, in the spirit of Figure 1d. If multiple intersections are an
issue, observe that for a small enough θ, the lower intersection becomes the relevant one.
Therefore, instead of using θ̌ as the relevant threshold, one should use the minimum of θ̌
and the value of θ for which the lower local maximum becomes the global maximum for
both effort choice problems.
Since both U1 and U2 converge to 0 as θ → −∞, e∗(θ) > e∗2(θ) for a small enough θ
implies that U1(θ) > U2(θ) for all these θ, too. Since we’ve established that small enough
and large enough θ authors prefer to work solo for γ < 1, and we’ve shown that there is
a positive mass of authors with interim abilities who prefer collaboration when γ is large
enough (but still less than 1), there must be at least one bounded interval of abilities that
contains collaborating authors.
43
